Gas Tax May Be a Simple and Good Enough Road Usage Charge

US road maintenance is underfunded. Unfortunately, current politics does not offer any sustainable funding ideas either. Instead, we hear about various one time patches like playing with custom tariffs or selling strategic oil reserves.

A good funding mechanism is based on the following principles:

1. It creates a steady income.
2. The Income grows and falls according to the road maintenance needs. This means it is related to the total driving mileage.
3. The funding burden is closely associated with individual road usage, in particular the damage one causes to the road structures when driving.
4. The mechanism is largely inflation-proof and does not require frequent political interference.

Freeways permit fast uninterrupted travel through dense urban environments. But they are not cheap. I-110 in LA.

By Adrian104 [Public domain], via Wikimedia Commons

In recent years we have seen an increased interest for "road usage charge", a user fee that depends on the actual driving mileage. Indeed, modern technology (currently tested in Oregon) allows to determine the exact mileage on different types of roads, and to send the driver the bill afterwards. Here I argue that we do not have to wait for the a technology to mature, as old-fashioned gas tax may serve as a good substitute for a smarter driving distance fee. I solely focus on road maintenance funding, and ignore congestion, pollution, and climate issues. Note that from this perspective there is no difference between fossil fuel, biofuel, and electric cars.

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Two arguments strongly favor gas tax over alternative funding mechanisms: it's simplicity and it's focus on road users. The main objections are related to it's impact on economy, and the fact that it is less than perfect measure of actual road usage.

• Gas tax is simple to introduce, collect and pay. First, the direct payments are done by big oil market operators who can easily handle a rather minor additional administrative burden. Second, most governments already collect it, hence the additional administrative burden would be even smaller. Third, such "pay-at-pump" scheme is the simplest imaginable tax for motorists. You pay for your gas and that's it.

  This contrasts to the proposed distance charge which is to be payed individually by millions of drivers. Hence the aggregated administrative burden for both private actors and public administrators is most likely higher. The distance tax must also be payed monthly or yearly, based on the actual driving, in a similar fashion as we currently do with the electricity bills. This also means the drivers have to keep some funds available for the tax payments later.

• Gas tax is payed according to road usage—the more you drive, the more you pay. Unfortunately, this correspondence is less than perfect. Cars come in different fuel economy and size and stress the roads differently. This is potentially the main objection against funding roads solely by gas tax.

  

  Heavy transport stresses the roads substantially more than small cars. Although trucks burn more fuel than cars, the gas tax may not compensate for the additional stress on roads. Here weight-dependent usage charge may have an advantage.

  By bilbobagweed (formby) [CC BY 2.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0)], via Wikimedia Commons

  But save the road usage charge, gas consumption is still far closer indicator of individual "road consumption" than any other alternative, such as income or sales tax. If gas tax is too crude a measure, how on earth can sales tax be a better one? But sales tax is widely used for funding transportation projects.

• Gas tax is often claimed to be a burden to the economy. But the picture is more complex. Sure, taxes hurt, but I don't see why should gas tax hurt more than the other taxes, in particular business and payroll taxes. If we introduce it in revenue neutral way, i.e. we lower the other taxes by exactly the same amount as we rise the gas tax, it amounts to redistributing the tax burden from the rest of the economy to large gas users. It is not immediately clear what are the economic implications. Transport intensive sectors will probably lose (but it also depends on what happens with road quality and congestion) while "human-intensive" sectors win from lower income tax. This includes technology companies that rely on a large well-payed workforce. I do not see the effect being much different from that of a better targeted road usage fee.

• Inflation diminishes the value of both gas tax and road usage charge in a similar way. Unless inflation-indexed, regular political decisions are needed to rise these accordingly. The usage charge possesses a clear advantage here as it does not depend on the vehicles' fuel economy. Gas tax must be adjusted both for inflation and fuel economy, usage charge only for inflation.

• Finally, many people may dislike the idea of government knowing exactly where and how much we drive. And the corresponding technology itself is not safe either—the ways to screw such meters will probably advance as well.

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We do not have to wait until a better technology solves the road funding problems. It may never arrive. Meanwhile, gas tax is a simple and good enough road usage fee. The problem is in politics, not in technology.

Tax Breaks for Protecting Landscape

Untouched nature is increasingly scarce.  This is even more true close to big population centers where such areas are of high value. Below I talk mostly of  forests but the ideas are more general.

Old forest.  Many snags and coarse woody debris offer habitat for a wide range of organisms.  Such forests are often suitable for recreational use as there is little undergrowth due to dense canopy above.  Conifer forests of Rattlesnake Ledge, WA

Land is typically taxed based on it's market value.  This approach is simple—it only depends on the size and location of the plot (although determining the value may be tricky).  However, it does not encourage the landowners to preserve the valuable habitats, nor does it encourage it to keep the land open to public.  It implicitly tells that the property owner is the sole decision-maker and does not have to take into account the others' interests.  But natural landscape is valuable not just for the landowner but also for other users, such as leisure trekkers or picnickers, and for many living organisms other than homo sapiens.  In economics parlance, natural landscape possesses positive externalities.

Keeping land open for everyone—for both nature and humans—should be an attractive option.  It can be encouraged by making land tax dependent on the type of usage.  Valuable natural habitats where the public has open access should be free of tax.  In other words, we should not tax land possession but only the "exclusion" of land, using it in a way that does not permit the others (including nature) to benefit from it.

Private property: Harvested natural forest is replaced by a plantation.  The area is made inaccessible both for humans and for large animals.  (Former) temporal forest in Veskimõisa, EE.

This approach will bring a number of changes:

• The landowners should only pay land tax on such a property that is either not open (like gardens and courtyards) or not natural (like fields).  Forests, natural meadows, and other habitats should be considered as "natural land".  If everyone has free access to these areas and human interference is kept at minimum, the land should be tax-free.  I mean "free access" in legal sense, the owner should not have any obligation to facilitate it through specific infrastructure.
• In case the landlord takes some of the natural area into non-natural use (say, by logging), then it will immediately be subject to tax.  The tax will decrease over time as the nature take over and the natural/leisure value of the area increases.
• Analogously, if land that was previously used for non-natural or restricted purpose is left untouched, the tax will fall over years as the value of it grows.
• If land tax is based on the market value, it implicitly (albeit imperfectly) takes into account how the human value of land depends on location.  Land near the population centers is expensive, and hence the potential land tax will be high.  Such a tax exemption encourages creation of publicly open natural areas close to cities more than it does that in far-lying locations.
• In order to be eligible for a lower tax rate, the natural value of the land must be re-assessed. The landowner should apply for re-evaluation, perhaps no more frequently than once in 5-10 years.  Such evaluation reports should be made public to decrease the room for corruption.
• Perhaps the largest problem with this proposal is the need to asses the non-market value of land.  It is a vague concept and leaves room for interpretation.  Simpler but less precise rules may be preferred instead.

Natural resources are a strong incentive to restrict public access.  Diamond area in South Africa, 1940s.

Who are the winners and the losers?  First, I don't think this measure would be massively used and hence the effects will be small. If it will, however, it may harm the logging and wood processing industry. Second, if the tax income from certain plots decreases, it must rise elsewhere (not just on land).  So it amounts to trading more nature for higher taxes.  Obviously, the winners are those who benefit from the nature and the losers are those who do not.  Finally, the largest gains are experienced by property owners who already keep their natural land open for everyone.

Miljöömaks ja kuidas seda kompenseerida

Muinsuskaitse nõuded ajaloolistele hoonetele on võrreldavad maksuga. Et vältida vanemate elupiirkondade lagunemist, tuleks (nõutele vastavat) renoveerimist osaliselt kompenseerida.

Täpsemalt Tartu Postimehes.

Milline on EE tööjõu maksumäär?

Siin arvutusreegel Eesti tööjõu piirmaksumäära rehkendamiseks.  Algselt oli see mõeldud lisana HEI loole: Kas Eesti maksusüsteemi võiks lihtsustada, aga sinna jõudis ainult keskmise maksumäära rehkendamise valem.

Lühidalt: tööjõu maksumäär on kolmeastmeline, kusjuures astmed on umbes 4, 25, ja 43 protsenti.  Loos ma ei maini ka seda, et tulumaksu vähendamine ning töötusmaksu sisseviimine on muutnud seda vähem progressiivseks.   Arvutuseeskiri on siin PNG failina, kui keegi oskab latexit mathml-ks muuta, siis aidake :-)

Maksupoliitka tööjõumaksude vaatepunktist

Eesti tööjõu maksusüsteem on vähem läbipaistev kui võiks arvata. Praegu vastab ta ligikaudu kaheastmelisele maksule, millest madalam on 35 ja kõrgem 43%.

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Mida näitab Eestis kehtiv 21% tulumaks? Võibolla üllatuslikult osutub, et peaaegu mitte midagi. Meile on tegelikult olulised kaks rahasummat: see summa, mis tööandja maksab (palgafond), ja summa, mille töötaja kätte saab (netopalk). Nende kahe summa vahe, nimetan seda siin tööjõumaksuks, läheb erinevate maksude näol riigile. Kui näiteks palgafond on 14 925 krooni kuus, siis töötaja saab sellest kätte 9000 krooni. Vahe, 5925 krooni, ongi tööjõu maksud. Eestis jagatakse tööjõumaksud kolmeks osaks: sotsiaalmaks, tulumaks, ja töötuskindlustusmakse. Niisugusel lahterdamisel ei ole aga majanduslikku sisu. Kui ettevõtjale on 14 925 krooni liiga palju, siis ta töötajat ei palka. Kui töötajale on 9000 krooni liiga vähe, siis ta tööle ei tule. Kus lõppeb sotsiaalmaks ja algab tulumaks, ei mängi siin mingit rolli.

Kuidas näeb siis praegune maksusüsteem välja tööjõumaksu vaatepunktist? Alloleval joonisel on näidatud tööjõumaksu protsent sõltuvalt netopalgast (must joon). Nagu näha, läheb tüüpiliselt umbes 40% palgafondist maksudeks. Kõige väiksem on see protsent -- umbes 35% -- 4000 kroonise netopalga juures, sellest veel väiksema palga korral hakkab maksumäär kiiresti kasvama.
Seega, vaatamata tulumaksuvabale miinimumile, on tööjõumaks kõige kõrgem väga madala palga juures. See on seotud sotsiaalmaksuga, õigemini sotsiaalmaksu miinimummääraga. Sõltumata sellest, kui väike on töötaja palk, tuleb sotsiaalmaksu maksta vähemalt miinimupalgalt (mis teeb maksu miinimumääraks 1436 krooni kuus). Kui täiskohaga töötajad teenivad vähemalt miinimupalga, siis osaajaga töö puhul see nii ei pruugi olla. Näiteks väikeste laste kõrvalt üksikute "otste" tegemisel, mis toovad sisse 1000 krooni kuus, kulub maksudeks 60% palgafondist. Sisuliselt ütleb maksusüsteem nii: "kui töötad, tööta palju. Kui töötad vähe, tee seda mustalt".

Viimastel aastatel arutletud võimaliku sotsiaalmaksu ülempiiri kehtestamise üle. Kuidas mõjutaks niisugune otsus tööjõu maksukoormust? Näitena (punane joon graafikul) eeldame, et sotsiaalmaksu ülempiiriks kehtestatakse 10 000 krooni. See tähendab, et ükskõik kui suurt palka tööandja maksab, sotsiaalmaksu ei pea maksma rohkem kui 10000 krooni kuus. Nagu jooniselt näha, kaasneb sellega tööjõumaksu määra kiire vähenemine alates umbes 25 000 kroonisest netopalgast. Seega on sotsiaalmaksu ülemmäär sisuliselt samaväärne kõrgepalgaliste madalama maksustamisega. Ehk siis astmelise tulumaksuga, kusjuures ülemise astme maksumäär on väiksem kui keskmisel astmel.

Kuidas kajastub Eesti viimase 10 aasta maksupoliitika tööjõumaksu kontekstis? Mäletatavasti oli aastal 2000 tulumaksumäär 26% ning töötuskindlustust ei olnud üldse. Praegu on tulumaksu määr vähenenud 5% võrra, samas on lisandunud kokku 4.2% töötuskindlustusmakse. Seega on tööjõumaks kõrgepalgaliste seas vähenenud üsna vähe. Palgaskaala madalamas otsas on aga olukord teine -- kuna maksuvaba miinimum töötuskindlustusmakse kohta ei kehti, on siin maksukoormus hoopis kasvanud.

Praegust maksusüsteemi saaks lihtsustada. Kõige lihtsam viis oleks kehtestada üks ja ühtne tööjõumaks, vajadusel mitmeastmeline. Näiteks võiks maks olla 35% väiksema kui 6000-kroonise tulu korral ja 43% seda ületavast tulust. Kui on soov kõrgepalgalisi madalamalt maksustada, võib ülespoole lisada veel ühe, madalama astme. Tööjõumaksust saadava tulu võiks riik siis juba edasi jagada Haigekassale, pensioniteks, ja muudeks vajalikeks otstarveteks. Nii muudaks maksusüsteemi ja ka maksupoliitika märgatavalt läbipaistvamaks.

Aga võibolla just seda poliitikakujundajad ei soovigi?

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Lisan siia juurde ka arvutuseeskirja, mille alusel on võimalik netopalga järgi leida brutopalk ning palgafond. Jäägu igaühe enda otsustada kui lihtne või keeruline on Eesti maksusüsteem.